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RETHINKING EXEMPTIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY
RICHARD E. MENDALES*
INTRODUCTION
Exemptions have always played a key role in consumer bankruptcy
law. They allow an individual debtor to keep some property after
bankruptcy with which to preserve at least a minimal standard of living
and to reenter the economy in a productive role rather than being cast
out from it. The importance of exemptions in the overall consumer
bankruptcy system, therefore, is similar to that of the discharge of most
debts.' Our present exemption law under § 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code,2 however, creates a system that is far too complex, inconsistent,
inequitable, burdensome—both to creditors and the consumer debtors
whom it is intended to protect—and rife with moral hazard.
No rational legislature, working from a clean slate, would design
a bankruptcy exemption system resembling the one created by § 522.
The problem is that the system was not drafted on a clean slate, but
represents an accretion of layers of sediment from earlier exemption
laws that were extremely problematic.3 Reform of bankruptcy exemp-
tion law has long been sought. It was a major recommendation of the
1970 Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (the
"1970 Commission"), whose report4 eventually led to the repeal of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the enactment of the present Bankruptcy
Code by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 5 The debate concerning
banruptcy exemptions has been thrown open again: first, by the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Reform Commission ("NBRC") with its report dated
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. A.B. 1969, A.M. 1970, University of Chicago; J.D.
1981, Yak Law School. I would like to thank Susan Block-Lich, Daniel Bogart, Patrick Gudridge,
Steven Ha!pert, Lynn LoPucki, Elliot Manning, George Mundstock, Elizabeth Warren and others
who helped with their connenis.
1 See Vern Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 Ru-ru.tas L. REV. 678,
678-79 (1960). The discharge of debt is the primary objective of most consumer debtors who file
for bankruptcy. See id. at 678.
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994).
3 See infra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
4 See COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doe. No. 93-137, pts. I and II (1973).
5 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)).
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October 20, 1997,6
 as part of a broader program of bankruptcy law
reform, and more recently by bills initiated by members of Congress
under pressure from the consumer credit industry' that would make
even more radical changes in the bankruptcy system.° Since consumer
bankruptcy law is once more being thoroughly reconsidered, it is time
to try again to reorganize bankruptcy exemptions into a statute that is
straightforward, effective and fair.
This Article proposes that we discard the central premise of § 522
as it stands—the allowance of exemptions in various amounts for spe-
cific categories of property held by a debtor at the time of the bank-
ruptcy petition, with the largest amount going for a homestead allow-
ance—and replace it with a system that will let debtors choose whatever
property they wish to exempt, limited only by a fixed maximum value
for all property exempted.° This will change bankruptcy exemption law
more fundamentally than the recent NBRC proposals would have
done, and in a way that, unlike Congressional attempts to restructure
bankruptcy law in the interest of the consumer credit industry, 10 will
promote fairness to consumer debtors as well as to their creditors.
6
 See generally NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM O N, FINAL REPORT, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS (1997) [hereinafter "NBRC REoottr"].
7
 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Non-Reform Proposed Changes Would Weaken Protections for Thuly Needy
Debtors and Leave Unchanged Gaping Loopholes that Wealthy Filers Use to Put Up the Shield of
Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at 134 (commenting that "Wile credit card industry has
hijacked efforts to reform bankruptcy laws"); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies
Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at Al; Katharine Q.
Seelye, House Passes Bill to Curb the Laws on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at A24;
Katharine Q. Seeiye, House Set to Vote on Bankruptcy Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A24.
See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998). The proposed Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1998 failed when the House, Senate and White House negotiators could not agree
on a compromise between the severely anti-debtor House bill and the much more moderate
Senate bill. See Major Bankruptcy Law Changes-105th Congress, LEGIS. BULL. (Am. Bankr. Inst.,
Alexandria, Va.), Oct. 28, 1998, at 1. The draconian House bill was reintroduced in the 106th
Congress as House Bill 833, and passed the House on May 5, 1999. Senate Bill 625, introduced
on March 16, 1999, roughly corresponds to its counterpart in the 105th Congress and is similarly
inconsistent with the bill passed by the House. Senate action on the bill is still pending.
9
 This simply takes exemption reform one logical step beyond the reforms proposed by the
NBRC. Similar proposals have been made prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, and
more recently for changing state exemption law in North Dakota and Minnesota, based primarily
on the problem of asset conversion. See Lowell R Bottrell, Comfortable Beds, A Church Pew, A
Cemetery Lot, One Hog; One Pig; Six Sheep, One Cow, a Yoke of Oxen or a Horse, and Your Notary
Seal: Some Thoughts About Exemptions, 72 N.D. L. REV. 83, 93-97 (1996); Countryman, supra note
1, at 746-48. This Article demonstrates that establishing a single umbrella exemption as the basis
for federal bankruptcy exemption law would better deal with the serious anomalies created by
§ 522 as it now stands.
l° See, e.g., H.R. 3150 (this bill would have severely restricted the rights of consumer debtors
to qualify for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, while leaving exemption law
substantially unchanged); S. 1301 (the Senate version would have left the basic structure of
July 19991	 RETHINKING BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS 	 853
Moreover, the proposals will reduce moral hazard to debtors and their
counsel, while helping to control the litigation costs fostered by the
present system.
I. How EXEMPTION LAW WORKS AND WHY IT DOESN'T
A. Overview
1. The Purposes of Personal Exemptions in Bankruptcy
The substantive purpose of personal exemptions in bankruptcy is
to ensure that individual debtors will not emerge from bankruptcy
completely destitute, but rather with certain basic properties needed
both to live from day to day and for a quick reentry into normal
economic life. 11 Without this kind of protection, the "fresh start" that
is a debtor's primary goal in consumer bankruptcy12 would, in most
cases, merely be a fresh path to new debt.
Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, this has meant that in most
states a debtor has been able to retain at least part of an interest in a
homestead plus certain personal property such as a vehicle, clothing,
tools of a trade, and pension or annuity rights.' 3 Unfortunately, how-
ever, both the kind and value of the property that a debtor has been
permitted to exempt has varied sharply according to his or her state
of residence and often provides a poor fit to a debtor's real needs.
Bankruptcy exemption policy also has what may be called a pro-
cedural purpose: to assure that debtors' rights (and the corresponding
rights of their creditors) do not sharply differ in bankruptcy from what
they would be outside of bankruptcy. On the one hand, this helps to
assure that debtors actually join in the collective process of paying
creditors in bankruptcy and resuming productive roles in the national
economy, rather than simply absconding and joining the underground
exemption law unchanged, although imposing maximum amounts on homestead exemptions in
contrast to the unlimited homestead amounts in Florida and Texas under present law).
" See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 79-80,169-70
(1973); Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return
to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CA-ni. U. L. Rev. 809,818 (1983); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the
Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235,240 (1995).
i 2 See generally ThRESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 20 (1989). The "fresh start" purpose of consumer bankruptcy has
become one of the chief icons of U.S. bankruptcy law since the metaphor was first used in Wetmore
v. Markoe. See 196 U.S. 68,77 (1904).
13 See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 640-41 (1997).
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economy." On the other hand, it reduces creditors' incentives to force
debtors into bankruptcy, in order to realize their claims against prop-
erty protected from seizure by judicial process to satisfy claims under
state law but not under federal bankruptcy law. 15
2. The Evolution of Exemption Law
Exemption law is not at all new. It can be traced at least as far back
as Roman law, under which a debtor was permitted under limited
circumstances to keep certain necessities for day-to-day survival. 16 A
brief discussion of the evolution of exemption law is in order, since the
current structure of § 522 is based not on a coherent attempt by
Congress to accomplish the purposes described above, but on an
accretion of past law from highly diverse sources, aggravated by a
serious wrong turn taken by Congress in 1898. 17
Current U.S. bankruptcy exemption law stems, at least substan-
tively, from English law that prevailed during the colonial period,
beginning in 1705, when debtors were first authorized to keep their
clothing and up to 5% of their remaining property as exempt from
their creditors.'8
 The British colonies in North America started with
this background exemption law early in the eighteenth century and
this in turn evolved into exemption statutes in each of the various states
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although the federal
Constitution specifically authorized Congress to enact uniform federal
bankruptcy laws,' 9
 Congress was slow to pass, and quick to repeal,
federal bankruptcy statutes during most of the nineteenth century."
" One of the purposes of the first long-lived federal bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, was to reduce debtors' incentives to simply run away from their creditors—especially to
debtor-friendly jurisclic dons such as Texas. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 245. The earliest
U.S. bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, expressly rewarded cooperative debtors with
a share of the total bankruptcy estate. See ch. 19, § 34, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
15 See, e.g., TABS, supra note 13, at 287-88.
16 See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L REV. 223,
238 (1918).
17 See COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 171 (1973).
18
 See 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705). Under this statute, debtors could exempt from their creditors'
claims 5% of their property, to a maximum of £200 (a very large amount at the lime), if on the
sale of their property creditors received a dividend of at least eight shillings on the pound (40%)
for their claims. If creditors received less, the commissioner appointed to deal with the debtor's
estate had the power to determine how much, if any, property the debtor would be permitted to
keep beyond his clothing.
19
 See U.S. CoNs-r. art 1, § 8, cl. 4.
"Despite the U.S. Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, Congress
enacted few bankruptcy statutes during the nineteenth century and all enacted before the 1898
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Therefore, until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 21 state
law was usually the only game in town, except for brief periods when
federal statutes prevailed. Because of this, no unitary approach to
exemption law was undertaken. Instead, exemption law evolved from
the sharply divergent strains of state law that were assimilated into
bankruptcy law when the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was passed.
State exemptions differed sharply from state to state. They were
not generally addressed to a collective insolvency process like bank-
ruptcy, but protected debtors from creditors enforcing particular judg-
ments by making certain kinds of property immune from seizure by
process of law. In so doing, they tended to reflect local politics, rather
than variations in the local cost and mode of living. Thus, in older,
commercially-oriented states such as Pennsylvania and Rhode Island,
they tended to be minimal, 22 while in newer, more agrarian states such
as Texas and Florida, they tended to be highly protective of debtors. 25
Moreover, state courts, in interpreting exemption statutes, tended to
focus narrowly on local law, avoiding the development of any national
consensus on broad principles or particular features of exemption
law. 24
The system was further complicated by the fact that legislatures in
many states were slow to update exemption statutes to match both the
changing ways in which people lived and general inflation in the cost
of living. As early as 1960, Professor Vern Countryman noted that
exemption statutes had become archaic in many states,25 Connecticut,
for example, kept substantially the same exemptions on its books,
without adjustment in value, from 1821 to 1977. 26 Although many
states, especially under the prodding of the 1978 federal Bankruptcy
Act were quickly repealed. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, was repealed in 1803;
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, was repealed in 1843; and the Bankruptcy Act of
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, was repealed in 1878.
21 See ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
"Neither Pennsylvania nor Rhode Island provides for a homestead exemption and both
provide only limited exemptions for personal property. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8123-8124
(West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-26-3 to -5 (1997).
23 See, e.g., 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (containing
exemption statutes for all U.S. states and territories and the District of Columbia); SULLIVAN ET
AL., supra note 12, at 28-30.
24 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 602-03 (1993).
22 See Countryman, supra note 1, at 681-84.
26 See id. at 683. Connecticut's parsimonious list of exemptions during this period let a debtor
exempt, inter alia, "two cords of wood, two tons of hay, five bushels each of potatoes and turnips,
ten bushels each of Indian corn and rye or the meal or flour manufactured therefrom." Id. (citing
GEN. STAT. CONN. § 52-352 (1958) (original version at GEN. STAT. CONN. tit. 2 act 74 (1821) (re-
pealed 1977)).
856	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 40:851
Code, have enacted reforms since that time, 27 archaic elements survive
in state exemption statutes, both in the types of exempt property
enumerated and in allowed valuations that, especially with the inflation
of recent years, have become pitifully inadequate in many jurisdic-
tions."
Contrary to what many in and out of Congress appear to believe,
federal bankruptcy law did not, in deference to states' rights, simply
absorb this state-by-state hodgepodge of exemption laws from its incep-
tion." The first federal bankruptcy act, 30
 enacted in 1800 and then
repealed in 1803, 31 included parsimonious but purely federal exemp-
tion provisions: a debtor was entitled to keep his or her "necessary"
clothing and bedding and that of his or her spouse and children. 32
In addition, the Act borrowed from British lawn in providing that a
bankrupt whose creditors received at least 50% of the value of their
claims could receive a dividend of 5% of the value of the estate (or
10% of the value of an estate whose creditors recovered at least 75%
of their claims), as a reward for cooperating with the bankruptcy
commissioners.34
 Thus, the first implementation of the Constitution's
Bankruptcy Clause by Congress indicated that those who drafted and
approved it did not believe that state law had any significant role to
play in the bankruptcy process.
From 1803 to 1841, the country went without a federal bankruptcy
statute. When Congress passed the 1841 Bankruptcy Act,35 in reaction
to the hard times following the Panic of 1837, the statute, like its
predecessor, established purely federal exemption provisions. 36 Also
like its predecessor, this statute was short-lived, and suffered repeal in
1843. 37
27 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
Maui. L. REV. 47, 95-96 (1997).
28 lowa, for example, allows a resident to exempt, inter alia, "(1) All wearing apparel of the
debtor and the debtor's dependents kept for actual use and the trunks or other receptacles
necessary for the wearing apparel, not to exceed in value one thousand dollars in the aggregate
.. (2) One shotgun, and either one rifle or one musket . ." IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (West
1998).
25 See, e.g., 4 COLLIER ON BANKnurror § 522.02(1) (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
"See ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
31 See TABLI, supra note 13, at 32 n.13.
32 See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 18, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
33 See 4 Anne ch. 17 (1705).
34 See ch. 19, § 34, 2 Stat. 19.
35 See ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
"See id. §
37 See TARE, supra note 13, at 32 n.14.
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Only with the third federal bankruptcy statute, that of 1867," did
state exemptions begin to creep into federal bankruptcy law. Even in
this case, however, their importance was secondary and was intended
to protect debtors rather than states' rights. The 1867 Act followed its
predecessors in creating meager but uniform federal exemptions. It
also authorized Civil War veterans to keep their uniforms and, recog-
nizing some of the hardships created by the parsimonious federal
exemptions, permitted debtors to claim state exemptions to the extent
they exceeded the federal amounts." Ironically, this provision gave rise
to significant objections to the law, on grounds that allowing debtors
to claim sharply varying state exemptions was contrary to the constitu-
tional mandate to create "uniform" bankruptcyal woo
The 1867 Act remained in effect longer than any of its predeces-
sors, surviving for eleven years. 4 ' This permitted a significant amount
of federal bankruptcy case law to evolve for the first time. Moreover, it
familiarized insolvency lawyers with federal bankruptcy concepts that
emerged again when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
which established federal bankruptcy as a permanent part of the legal
landscape. Restoration of federal bankruptcy was, however, fiercely
contested. The struggle to pass a new bankruptcy statute raged for
fifteen years and succeeded only with the hard times following the
Panic of 1893, when a backlog estimated at 150,000 to 200,000 persons
in need of relief had to be addressed. 42 It is thus not surprising, amid
the compromises attending such a struggle, that when Congress en-
acted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, it took a wrong turn on the exemp-
tion issue. The Act abandoned federal exemptions suddenly and com-
pletely by authorizing debtors to take whatever exemptions to which
they were entitled under state law and no more.°
It was thus the 1898 Act, rather than considerations of federalism
inherent in interpreting the Bankruptcy Clause, that established bank-
ruptcy exemptions as incorporating state exemption law. Many of the
failings of the system described in this Article" were recognized early
in the Act's life.'" The Act's long life, however, led lawyers and politi-
38 See ch. 176,14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
s9
 See id. § 14.
40
 See S.E.B., The Constitutionality of the Concluding Exemption Clause in the Bankrupt Law,
15 AM, L. REG. 721-27 (1867).
41 See, e.g., TABS, supra note la, at 32-33 & n.15.
42 See 58 ALB. L.J. 18 (1898); see also 47 CE r, U. 27 (1898).
45 See ch. 541, § 6,30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
44 See infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
45 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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clans to think of the federal incorporation of state exemptions as a
fundamental part of bankruptcy law and made it politically impossible
to correct the system when Congress superseded the Act with the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978,46
 despite abundant criticism by commenta-
tors and the recommendations of the 1970 Commission. 47
3. How Exemption Law Works Under Bankruptcy Code § 522
The very act of describing the exemption system established by
Bankruptcy Code § 522 in 1978 helps to illustrate one of its major
flaws: it is far too complex." Not only is the statutory section itself a
labyrinth whose complications make it unsuitable for use in consumer
bankruptcy,49
 but its ambiguities, lacunae and conflicting judicial
glosses all combine to make its fair application extremely difficult.
Under the present Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor in
financial difficulty may file for relief under Chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13.
Regardless of the chapter under which a debtor files, the petition
creates a bankruptcy estate consisting of substantially all the debtor's
property interests." For debtors who file under Chapter 7—used by a
substantial majority of all who file for bankruptcy relief"—there is a
basic quid pro quo that requires them to surrender substantially all of
their property interests to the trustee in bankruptcy in exchange for a
discharge of most creditors' claims." The surrendered interests go into
the bankruptcy estate. Property in the estate, unless encumbered by
liens or protected by exemptions, is liquidated and the proceeds are
distributed to creditors according to the order of priority accorded to
them by the Bankruptcy Code and in proportion to the sizes of their
claims."
After the bankruptcy estate is created, a Chapter 7 debtor has the
right to exempt certain property in the estate from distribution to
46 see, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 119-20.
47 See COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 170-73 (1973).
"Complexity is a major fault not only of § 522, but of the entire consumer bankruptcy
system. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR.
U. 483, 494-95 (1997).
43
 See infra Part 1.8.2.
50 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994). There are some exceptions to this rule, most notably the
debtor's beneficial interest in trusts such as pension funds qualified under ERISA. See generally
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
51 See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 33.
52 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 727 (1994).
58 See id. §§ 363, 506-507, 726.
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creditors under Code § 522(b)." Variations in the basis for exemption,
concerning both the types of property that the debtor may exempt
under § 522 and the value that may be exempted for each type, raise
the problems with which this Article is primarily concerned.
Under § 522(b), a debtor, absent legislative action by his or her
state, has the right to choose between: (1) the federal exemptions now
enumerated in § 522(d), 65 and (2) the exemptions available under
state law, plus property exempt under non-bankruptcy federal law." If
two debtors are spouses filing jointly for bankruptcy, both must elect
exemptions from the same list."
The apparent choice described above is further complicated by
an additional provision authorizing states to "opt out" of the federal
list of exemptions, with the effect of denying their residents the right
to choose the federal exemptions. 58 Since at least thirty-four states have
opted out of the federal exemptions," their residents are back under
the state law exemption regime of the former Act, with all of that
system's problems and inequities.
A debtor seeking bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7 thus con-
fronts the following situation: if the debtor's state has not opted out of
the federal list of exemptions, the debtor will have to study both the
federal list under Code § 522(d) and the list of state exemptions
available in his or her jurisdiction, in addition to non-bankruptcy
federal exemptions, in order to choose the most advantageous set of
exemptions." Since debtor spouses filing jointly must both choose
from the same list,6 ' this choice can be quite complex. Even if the
debtor or debtors live in a typical opt-out state, however, taking full
advantage of their exemption rights requires surveying state law that
may be scattered across many different statutes 62 and deciding how best
to utilize such statutes to maximize the value of property they may
exempt. This, in turn, invites attempts to reshuffle property by means
of "asset conversion," which may lead debtors, as described below,"
54 See id. § 522(b).
55 See id. § 522(b) (1).
" See id. § 522(b) (2).
" See 11 § 522(b).
58 See id. § 522(b) (1).
59 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.02[1] & 11.3 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
In Florida, for example, exemption rights are specified, inter alia, at Ft.A. CONST. art. X,
§ 4, and at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.151, 222.01, 222.02, 222.05, 222.14, 222.18, 222.21, 222.22,
222.25, 222.201, 443,051, 497.413, 632.619, 744.626, 769.05, and 960.14 (West 1994).
63 See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
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into a thicket of conflicting law in which even skilled counsel—not
readily obtainable by most consumer debtors—may have difficulty in
providing good advice.
B. Problems with the Present System
1. Well-Recognized Problems
Scholars, judges and practicing lawyers have long recognized that
the exemption system is beset with difficulties. 64 The most basic prob-
lems fall primarily into two categories: lack of uniformity in treatment
of debtors from state to state, and problems associated with "bank-
ruptcy planning"—the deliberate shifting of assets from non-exempt
to exempt categories by debtors contemplating bankruptcy.
Lack of geographical equity among debtors was a well-recognized
failing of the former Bankruptcy Act, 65
 which, as noted above, did not
provide a list of federal exemptions but merely permitted debtors to
claim their exemptions under state law. 56
 The original report of the
1970 Bankruptcy Reform Commission, recommending exemption re-
form as part of what became the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
proposed to remedy this by permitting debtors to exempt property
only as enumerated on a federal exemption list. 67 Congress, however,
failed to adopt this highly sensible proposal c5
 While § 522(d) created
the recommended federal list, the opt-out provisions of § 522(b) leave
most debtors with exemptions that vary incredibly from state to state,
64
 Professor Vern Countryman argued strongly for a new bankruptcy exemption system at a
1960 symposium on bankruptcy law, well before the 1970 Commission recommended its reforms.
In so doing, he cited still earlier calls for reform. See Countryman, supra note 1, at 680,683,
passim; COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93•137, pt. I, at 170-73 (1973).
°5
 The Act's adoption of state exemptions was attacked almost immediately as failing to
comply with the Constitution's uniformity requirement, although this attack was turned aside,
without satisfactory explanation, by the Supreme Court. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186
U.S. 181, 188-90 (1902). Commentators attacked the inherent unfairness of adopting state
exemption law for bankruptcy purposes early on. See, e.g., WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER ET AL.,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 141 (7th ed. 1909). The attack was renewed by Professor Countryman
in 1960. See Countryman, supra note 1, passim. His criticisms have been accepted by most of those
who have studied the question since, including both of the Bankruptcy Reform Commissions. See
COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 81-82; NBRC REPORT, supra note
6, at 212-92.
66 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 6, 70a, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
67
 See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 170-73.
68 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)).
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ranging, for example, from almost non-existent exemptions in Rhode
Island69 to virtually unlimited homestead exemptions in Texas and
Florida." This inequity between state exemptions may lead to a situ-
ation where a debtor will move to a different state with the purpose
of taking advantage of more generous exemptions. For example, a
wealthy debtor who can exempt only $40,000 of the value of his or her
Wisconsin homestead will be strongly tempted to plan for bankruptcy
by moving to Florida and taking advantage of the almost unlimited
Florida homestead exemption."
An even more common form of bankruptcy planning that raises
problems is the exchange of non-exempt property for exempt property
during the year prior to bankruptcy. Nothing in the present Bank-
ruptcy Code expressly limits a debtor's ability to exchange non-exempt
property for exempt property of equivalent value as a key part of
"bankruptcy planning."" This practice, generally known as "asset con-
version," has led to frequent litigation and highly inconsistent applica-
tion of the law. The problem arises because courts often find asset
conversion on the eve of bankruptcy to be objectionable, especially
when non-exempt assets are converted into assets that are subject to
very high or unlimited exemption amounts."
This issue is well illustrated by two cases simultaneously decided
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 74 In Hanson v. First National
" Rhode Island does not permit a debtor to exempt a homestead, although it allows exemp-
tions for his or her body and burial plot. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-26-3, -4(5) (1997). The live
debtor may exempt "necessary wearing apparel," tools of a trade up to a value of $500, up to
$1,000 of "household furniture and family stores," bibles and other books up to the value of $300,
up to $50 in wages or salary, and certain other personal property under R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4
(1997). One concession to modernity introduces a discordant note, totally out of keeping with
the general parsimony of Rhode Island law: a debtor may exempt an individual retirement
account, pension or retirement annuity without any limit in amount under R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-26-4(11) to (12) (1997).
7° See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (homesteads up to 160 acres outside municipalities and up to
one-half acre within municipalities are exempt from forced sale by creditors, except for govern-
ment sale to recover unpaid taxes, without regard to value).
71 See generally In re Barker, 168 B.R. 773 (13ankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Coplan, 156 B.R. 88
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
73 This has been true both under the former Bankruptcy Act and under the present Code.
See Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank, 848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988) (decided under the current
Code); Ford v. Poston, 773 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under the current Code); In re
Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1983) (decided under the current Code); Forsberg v. Security
State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926) (decided under the repealed Act).
73 See Levine v. Weissing (In re Levine), 134 F.3d 1046, 1054 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that
debtors' conversion of non-exempt assets to exempt assets by purchase of annuities was a "trans-
fer" for purposes of Florida fraudulent transfer law),
74 See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
862	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:851
Bank, the debtors were jointly-filed family farmers in South Dakota. 75
When they encountered financial problems, they followed their attor-
ney's advice by selling $34,000 worth of non-exempt property—a car,
two vans, a motor home and household furnishings—to their sons. 76
They used the proceeds to purchase life insurance policies with cash
surrender value totaling $20,000 and prepaid $11,000 on their home
mortgage, thereby taking advantage of exemptions available under
South Dakota law.77
 When a creditor objected to this claim of exemp-
tions, the court supported the debtors, noting that "[i] t is well estab-
lished that under the Code, a debtor's conversion of non-exempt
property to exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy for the express
purpose of placing that property beyond the reach of creditors, without
more, will not deprive the debtor of the exemption to which he oth-
erwise be entitled."
While affirming the lower courts in Hanson, the same Eighth
Circuit panel affirmed another set of lower courts in Norwest Bank
Nebraska v. Tveten. 79 In Norwest Bank, the debtor had done substantially
the same thing as the debtors in Hanson, except that the debtor in
Norwest Bank had converted $700,000 in non-exempt property into an
annuity that his attorney advised him was entirely exempt under Min-
nesota law.5° Like the debtors in Hanson, the debtor in Norwest Bank
had obtained fair appraisals for the property converted and had acted
openly.5' In his case, however, the courts held that his conversion of
non-exempt to exempt property was a fraudulent transfer and denied
him his discharge in bankruptcy. 52
 The only clear distinction between
the facts of the two cases is the size of the exemption claimed, or, as
Judge Arnold quoted in his dissent in Norwest Bank, "when a pig
becomes a hog it is slaughtered."53 Judge Arnold's dissent argued that
the Bankruptcy Code provides no guidance on matters porcine. 54 Ac-
cordingly, the problem was not with the debtor's action in Norwest
Bank, nor with his intent, but in the allowance of an unlimited exemp-
73 See 848 F.2d 866,867 (8th Cir. 1988).
"See id.
" See id.
78
 Id. at 868.
79 See 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
80
 Ironically, after denial of Dr. Tveten's discharge, the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated
the state's unlimited exemption of property held in annuities issued by fraternal organizations.
See id. at 872-73 & n.3.
81 See id. at 872-73 & n.l.
82 See id. at 876-77.
83 Id. at 879 (quoting In is Zouhar, 10 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981)).
84 See 848 F.2d at 879.
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don under state law." If the debtor in Norwest Bank had owned his
$700,000 annuity more than a year prior to bankruptcy, instead of
buying it when he did, his exemption would have been undisturbed by
the federal courts despite the size of the exemption. 86
In Norwest Bank, the debtor's treatment occurred in the absence
of clear law forbidding what he did and the case provides no guidance
to similarly situated debtors as to the value at which the conversion of
non-exempted property will trigger drastic consequences for the debt-
or. It is even more disturbing that the court found deliberate fraud in
his case despite the fact that he acted in good faith on the advice of
his attorney. 87 That the mere size of a transaction can transform it from
a normal part of the bankruptcy process to intentional fraud is an
anomaly, the absurdity of which is reflected in the major ethical di-
lemma that it creates for bankruptcy lawyers. Attorneys are strictly
forbidden to advise or assist clients engaging in fraud," but are also
required to act competently and diligently on behalf of their clients. 89
An attorney who, seeking the best result for a client, counsels that
client to maximize exemptions within the amounts allowed by state law,
may be violating the rules of professional responsibility by inadver-
tently counseling fraud; but the attorney who counsels the same client
to take less than the amount to which the client may be entitled is also
breaking the rules by disserving that client.
The current system also suffers from other major problems that,
while already recognized by some authorities, have not received as
much attention as the anomalies described above. The existing system
not only discriminates between the residents of different states, but
also discriminates among debtors who are otherwise similarly situated.
As § 522 is now structured, the system discriminates against renters in
favor of homeowners, against urbanites in favor of rural residents"—
particularly farmers—and more generally against the poor in favor of
the well-to-do. This is true not only for debtors residing in opt-out
states, but even for those who can and do elect the federal list of
exemptions 9' It is not only strange to see this in a consumer bank-
85 See id. at 878-79.
85 See 11 U.S.G. § 548 (1994).
87 See Norwest Bank, 848 F.2d at 872-73.
88 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
88 See id. Rules 1.1, 1.3 cm'. 1.
" See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977).
91 Under the federal list of exemptions, as created in Code § 522(d), as of April 1, 1998, a
debtor who owns a home may exempt $16,150, as a homestead. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 104, 522(d)(1)
(1994); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in The Bankruptcy Code Presribed Under Section
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ruptcy system, but it goes against the basic principles of equity that are
supposed to drive the bankruptcy process.
2. Additional Objections to the System
Exemption law is consumer lawY Its primary intended beneficiar-
ies are people whose strained financial circumstances do not permit
them to incur the major legal expenses needed to vindicate rights in
a labyrinthine system. The complexity and ambiguity of current ex-
emption law are problems in and of themselves. Not only do they lead
to inconsistencies and inequities in application of the law, but their
existence makes this body of law ill-suited to the needs of the consum-
ers for whom the law is designed to benefit. The reason is that proper
protection of the rights available under the law requires more legal
time and talent than are cost-effective for consumer debtors, who are
typically represented by lawyers taking large numbers of cases for flat
fees or who may even try to represent themselves."
The present system also gives debtors incentives to keep property
in categories that may not be in their best interests. The homestead
exemption, which is the largest exemption both on the federal list94
and under the law of most states, exemplifies this problem. Apart from
the problems created when debtors sell non-exempt property to take
advantage of large homestead exemptions, a debtor who lives in a
particular jurisdiction, because of a large homestead exemption, may
not be allocating property in the best way to enable him or her to
emerge from bankruptcy with a genuine "fresh start." In fact, the
debtor might have a better chance of full financial recovery, in bank-
ruptcy or even without going through bankruptcy, by making a move
104(B) of The Code, 63 Fed. Reg. 7179, 7179 (1998) (adjusting the amounts of § 522(d)). The
exemption is permanent under § 522(c), unless the case is dismissed. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)
(1994). The debtor may sell the home and have $16,150 in cash to use toward new housing or
as a grubstake to a new business. See id. §§ 104, 522(d) (1); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts
in The Bankruptcy Code Presribed Under Section 104(B) of The Code, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7179. A
renter, or a homeowning debtor whose more pressing financial circumstances are reflected in a
lack of equity in his or her home, may apply a maximum of $8,075 of the unused amount of the
homestead exemption to protect other property under § 522(d)(5). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 104,
522(d) (5); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in The Bankruptcy Code Presribed Under Section
104(B) of The Code, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7179.
92 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (exemptions available only to individual debtors).
93 See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 22-23. The extent of this problem is illustrated
by the enactment of Bankruptcy Code § 110, 11 U.S.G. § 110, added in 1994 by Pub. L. 103-394,
Title III, § 308(a), 108 Stai 4135. This section seeks to regulate non-attorney "petition preparers,"
who have, under the guise of preparing bankruptcy petitions for unrepresented debtors, widely
offered bankruptcy advice to such debtors despite their own lack of legal qualifications.
94 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
July 1999]	 RETHINKING BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS	 865
to another jurisdiction where more or better work is available. A self-
employed debtor might be well-advised to make at least a temporary
switch to rental housing and use the homestead value in his or her
business.
The convolution of the present system also distracts those working
within the system from what should be its central focus: how much
property should a debtor be able to keep as part of a "fresh start" in
bankruptcy? This question is central to two problems of fairness: (1)
fairness between a debtor and creditors, and (2) equality of treatment
among debtors in the bankruptcy system. The forest tends to be lost,
however, in debates over the trees—how much value should a debtor
be allowed to exempt for a homestead, for tools of a trade, or an
annuity?
Focusing on the trees raises an additional problem in terms of
legislation: some provisions may become Christmas trees for special
interest groups. This is, of course, a problem for federal legislation in
general, but it has been a special problem for the Bankruptcy Code.
A recent example of this problem arising with respect to the Code's
exemption provisions is § 522(f) (3), which limits a debtor's right to
avoid liens on certain kinds of property, such as tools of the trade and
farm animals, to a maximum of $5,000." The fact that Congress limited
this particular exemption while refusing to limit more serious abuses
as to other exemptions, particularly those dealing with homesteads,
indicates that this was a response to the goring of particular oxen.
C. The Insufficiency of Previous Proposals
The 1970 Commission's recommendations for a single federal list
of exemptions,96 which eventually became the list of federal exemp-
tions enumerated in Code § 522(d), provide the basis for the most
recent proposals for exemption law reform. Those recommendations
were derived from generalization of state exemption law, but did not
afford states the power to opt out or allow debtors to choose state
exemptions. Accordingly, most subsequent criticism of § 522 has cen-
tered around its reintroduction of state law through its debtor's choice
and opt-out provisions, and has tended to recommend eliminating
states' rights to opt out, which would restore a pure federal list of
exemptions.°
95 See id. § 522(0(3).
96 See COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 171-73 (1973).
97 See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 246 (1997); NATIONAL RANIER. CONFER-
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The NBRC moved beyond this position with the recommenda-
tions for reforming exemption law as part of the report that it made
public on October 20, 1997.98
 Although the report was dead on arrival
due to purely political reasons, its recommendations were sensible and
would have significantly ameliorated many of the exemption system's
problems. Even if fully implemented, however, the recommendations
would not have completely addressed all the problems with the current
system as noted in this Article.
The NBRC repeated the 1970 Commission's recommendation
that a uniform set of federal exemptions should supplant the complex
hybrid of state and federal exemptions available under present § 522."
It went further than its predecessor by stepping away not only from
direct application of state exemption law, but from most of the laundry
list of exempt amounts derived from state law that now constitutes the
set of federal exemptions found in § 522(d). Instead, it would have
allowed a debtor to take a homestead exemption in an amount that
would still be based on state law, but ranging from a floor amount of
$30,000 to a ceiling of $100,000, plus an unlimited amount for medical
equipment and a lump sum amount of $20,000 to be allocated to other
personal property according to the debtor's wishes.'"
It is unfortunate that the NBRC did not simply discard the concept
of classified exemptions entirely. By maintaining some links to state
exemption law, both in basing exemptions on particular types of prop-
erty and particularly in maintaining a strong connection to state law
concerning homestead exemptions, it continued the law's discrimina-
tion in favor of homeowners and against both renters and urban
residents.m It also sustained the problem noted above of giving debtors
incentives to maintain an allocation of property that might be less than
optimal for attaining a "fresh start."'" Moreover, from a practical point
of view, continuing the linkage to state exemption law invited Congres-
sional amendments that would, as with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, restore most or all of the old system through the back door.
ENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 109-10 (1999); Williann .J. Woodward, Jr., Exemptions,
Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 375-76 (1982).
" See NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 121-44.
" See ki.
100 See id. at 125-33.
101 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
1 °2 See supra Part 1.B.2.
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II. CHASING THE HOGS OUT OF COURT: A MODEST PROPOSAL
A. The Proposal: Replace the Entire Exemption System with a Single
Value for All Exempt Assets
It is time to discard the entire convoluted exemption structure
and start over. This is hardly an unprecedented move; the drafters of
the entire Bankruptcy Code took that approach with the prior Bank-
ruptcy Act, which itself had become too convoluted over eighty years
of evolution to simply reform by tinkering.
1. The Basic Proposal
Instead of providing for its present multifarious set of exemption
categories, § 522 should permit a debtor to exempt a fixed total value
of property (which, for purposes of this Article, will be referred to as
the "umbrella" amount) of any kind. The amount may be left up to
debate, although a figure around $50,000 seems fair as a starting point
for legislative bargaining. 1°3 The debtor would choose the property to
be protected, claiming appropriate values for items on the schedule of
exempt property. As under present law, two debtors filing jointly as
spouses could aggregate their exemptions.m
Parties in interest, such as creditors, the U.S. Trustee and the
trustee in bankruptcy, would be able to object only to a debtor's
valuation of property to be included under the $50,000 umbrella.
Valuations would be based on resale value as of the time of filing and
not on acquisition price. 105 This is an important part of the proposal
that addresses some major concerns that might otherwise make it
unacceptable. Basic personal property such as clothing, medical de-
vices and items of sentimental value such as photographs are likely to
have little or no resale value, and therefore should not be subject to
1"This would allow a debtor couple filing jointly to exempt a total of $100,000, a round
number equal the the NBRC's proposed ceiling on homestead allowance alone. As such, it is a
compromise between the present high and low extremes permitted under state and federal law,
high enough to protect debtors' tenuous hold on middle-class status and to eliminate most
exemption litigation, while low enough to avoid providing incentives for strategic bankruptcy
filings.
10 See 11 U.S.C.§ 522(b) (1994).
105 SeeAssociates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S 953, 965 (1997) (establishing collateral
value as replacement value rather than foreclosure sale value for purposes of Chapter 13 cram
down). While not directly on point for exemption purposes, Associates Commercial Corp, is
incorrectly decided both as a matter of Code interpretation and in terms of bankruptcy policy
and should be expressly overruled by amendments to the Code.
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increased risk of sale as compared to present law. In fact, protection
of property of this kind may be significantly greater than under state
law in many opt-out jurisdictions.
The proposal will not affect periodic payments under most pen-
sion plans, which will continue to be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate under Code § 541(c).' 06
 It may be desirable to amend § 541(c),
however, to make absolute the exclusion of other similar periodic
payments for old age, disability and dependent support from the bank-
ruptcy estate. Any such amendments should carefully limit the exclu-
sions to periodic payments outside the control of the debtor.
2. Filling in Some Details
Certain parts of the present statute, now codified at § 522(e)
through (m), need to be retained, although even they should be
simplified. These retentions are necessary both for procedural consid-
erations and to prevent certain abuses.
Procedure should remain substantially the same as under current
law: the debtor will be required to file a schedule of property claimed
as exempt, noting values for all items claimed. Parties in interest,
including creditors, the trustee in bankruptcy and the U.S. Trustee,
would have the right to object to the claims of exemption prior to a
certain bar date.'° 7
 One relatively minor modification would deal with
the risk that a debtor might claim more than he or she is entitled to,
in the hope that no party would object. 1 °9
 In that case, the trustee in
bankruptcy and the U.S. Trustee would have the right to object to a
claim of exemption after the bar date on a showing that a claim of
exemption was based on actual fraud.
The umbrella amount would, like the amounts currently provided
for by the federal list of exemptions,'°9
 be subject to cost of living
adjustment at regular intervals under Code § 104. 11°As noted below,'"
Congress might also consider an option to adjust the amount for
geographic differences in cost of living.
we' See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (ERISA-qualified
pension plan excluded from estate under § 541(c)).
107 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994).
1118 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 638 (1992) (sustaining debtor's claim of
exemption for non.exempt property in absence of timely objection by creditor); Lynn M. LoPucid,
Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am. BANKR. L.J. 461, 468-70 (1997).
1119 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
no see id. § 104 .
111 See infra paragraph accompanying note 119.
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One of the important provisions of the current Bankruptcy Code
is § 522(f), which provides for avoiding liens encumbering certain
kinds of personal property in order to permit the debtor to claim them
as exempt." 2 The purpose of this lien avoidance is to prevent unscru-
pulous creditors holding non-purchase money security interests in
debtors' personal property that has little or no cash value, but high
personal value, from using the leverage created by the security interests
to coerce debtors into reaffirming debts in amounts far more than the
actual value of the encumbered property.'" A revised statute will need
to retain this, at least in simplified form, unless Congress also adopts
the NBRC's recommendation that would do away with reaffirmations,
except for debt secured by the debtor's home. 114
The bankruptcy court will need to retain considerable discretion
concerning exemptions. This will be exercised chiefly in the matter of
valuation of exempt property. The court should also, however, have
some discretion to modify a particularly improvident use of exemp-
tions by a debtor, particularly where the debtor has dependents who
will be affected by the debtor's choice of exempt property." 5
The court's discretion might also be extended to make a single
exception to the rigor of the normal exemption limit for professionally
prescribed medical equipment. The NBRC Report recognized the
need for and potential high cost of such equipment and would have
placed it in an automatically exempt special category." A blanket
exception of that nature, however, raises certain moral hazards. For
instance, a debtor could take advantage of an unqualified exemption
to engage in pre-bankruptcy planning, buying gold-plated equipment
that could be reconverted after bankruptcy into fully functional but
much cheaper equipment plus cash. The best way to deal with the
problem appears to be to allow the court to consider an application
for a special exemption for such equipment and to allow the special
exemption on a showing of: (1) genuine need; (2) prescription by a
properly qualified physician or other professional; and (3) nonavail-
ability of equally effective lower cost substitutes.
112 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1)(1)(B) (1994).
113 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126-27 (1977).
114 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 145-69.
115 The Bankruptcy Code already delegates this kind of discretion to the bankruptcy court
in other situations. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 523(a)(15), 524 (1994).
116 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at § 1.2.4.
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3. Options
Although the proposal will be most effective in the simple form
described above, it may need to be made more politically palatable in
order to assure enactment. Although legislative proponents should be
careful to avoid letting the old, complex system in through the political
back door, they might consider including certain minimal options in
the revised statute in order to win Congressional approval.
The basic option that should be considered for this purpose might
be called the states' rights option. It is crucially important that this
option, if it is available at all, be kept in substantially the simple form
proposed and not let out of control, as happened with the present
§ 522(b)."7
 Under the terms of this option, a debtor would be able to
exempt the aggregate value of property that he or she could exempt
under the law of his or her state. In order to assure nationwide uni-
formity and to prevent abuses noted under the present exemption
system, however, this amount would be subject to national upper and
lower limits. The upper limit should be no more than 50% above the
federal amount otherwise described; the lower limit perhaps 50% of
the federal amount, subject to negotiation. These limits would, like the
federal umbrella amount, be subject to regular cost of living adjust-
ment under Code § 104.' 18
This option, in addition to making the proposal more politically
acceptable, would also have the advantage of reducing potential differ-
ences between state and federal exemptions. This would reduce dis-
crepancies in substantive rights between bankruptcy and non-bank-
ruptcy law, thereby reducing potential incentives for creditors to file
involuntary bankruptcy cases against debtors in order to recover
against debtor property that would have been protected against their
claims under state law. By reducing the potential incentives for credi-
tors to file involuntary bankruptcy cases against debtors, the likely
effect is that there will be a decrease in the amount of involuntary
actions against consumers.
The superior option, however, would take into account economic
reality rather than state borders. Under this option, the umbrella
amount would be subject to adjustment for geographical variations in
the cost of living, thereby taking into account the fact that a $25,000
exemption for a debtor in New York City is worth far less than the same
nominal exemption in Fargo, North Dakota. Salaries of many federal
ill See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
118 See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
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employees are already subject to adjustment in this same way in areas
where the cost of living is especially high." 9 Although this option would
be preferable in terms of accomplishing the purposes of exemption
law, its disregard of traditional state lines would probably make it more
difficult to push through Congress.
B. Advantages of the Proposal Over the Current System and Other
Reform Proposals
The best way to test the merits of this proposal, short of actual
controlled experiments, is to see how well it deals with the problems
described above. As will be shown, the proposal deals with them well
enough that comparatively little discussion of each is needed.
1. Theoretical Advantages
This proposal will help debtors optimize their "fresh start" capa-
bilities and help creditors make more realistic pre-bankruptcy deci-
sions, while minimizing wasteful litigation. In addition, simplifying the
analysis of how much property they can protect will also aid debtors in
making better decisions regarding whether to file under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13. It will also permit legislators revisiting the system to ad-
dress the key issue of how much property a fair bankruptcy process
should permit a debtor to shield from creditors. Moreover, it minimizes
the consideration of exemptions for certain types of property and the
temptations offered by special interests in considerations of that kind.
Furthermore, the proposal will permit debtors to allocate their per-
sonal resources in ways that best suit their post-bankruptcy needs,
rather than forcing them into the Procrustean bed of the old catego-
ries of exempt property. Bankruptcy planning will thus be transformed
from its present status of ethically ambiguous loophole-seeking into
more straightforward and realistic financial planning.
A related consideration is that the proposal should significantly
reduce another kind of moral hazard: debtors' temptation to conceal
or fraudulently transfer previously non-exempt assets such as jewelry.
The flexibility of the proposal will let debtors lawfully exempt property
of this kind, at least up to a reasonable value.
"9 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5304 (1994) and regulations and executive orders thereunder.
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2. Practical Advantages
One of the chief problems with rights created by consumer legis-
lation, both at the federal and state levels, has always been the expense
of legally enforcing them. Theoretical rights are of little advantage to
consumers who cannot afford expensive legal talent. This is a particu-
lar problem for bankruptcy exemption laws, since consumer bank-
ruptcy lawyers often work for fixed, relatively limited fees. In addition,
procedures such as administrative enforcement and class action suits
cannot be used to enforce complex exemption rights in the ways that
they can for other consumer legislation such as the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act.'"
By drastically simplifying exemption law, the proposal will make it
available on a more favorable basis to real life consumers and should
substantially reduce legal malpractice in this area. As such, it could
serve as a useful prototype for simplifying other areas of consumer
bankruptcy law. Consumers will not be the only beneficiaries, however,
since even creditors will benefit from reduced opportunities for abuse
by well-to-do debtors, and from lower litigation costs. The bankruptcy
courts, administrative system and overall process will benefit from
savings in time and resources and reduced incentives for fraud.
3. Answers to Possible Objections
a. The Proposal Will Upset Entitlements
Both debtors and creditors are likely to object that the proposal
will seriously detract from their present rights. Debtors are likely to
focus on the homestead exemption, which would most likely be limited
by the proposal's overall umbrella amount. This is an emotional issue
and one can imagine the anguished protests to the effect that debtors
entitled to keep their homes under present law would lose them under
this proposal.
There are a number of good answers to such arguments. First,
even in the two states with virtually unlimited homestead exemptions,
Florida and Texas, debtors who have mortgaged their homesteads will
still forfeit them unless they can make appropriate deals with the
mortgagees.'" It is not at all clear why it is worse for a debtor to forfeit
a home to a trustee in bankruptcy than to a mortgagee; or, for that
140 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(c)-1681(t) (1994).
121
 See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a); TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50.
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matter, why it should be more difficult to make a home-preserving deal
with a trustee. In any event, like the existing set of federal exemptions
under § 522(d), most states do not provide unlimited exemptions for
homesteads. In those states, to the extent that the homestead is unen-
cumbered, the trustee in bankruptcy will sell the homestead property
and pay the amount protected by the homestead exemption to the
debtor in cash. 122 Even in Florida, where the exemption is unlimited
in dollar value but limited in area to one-half acre in urban regions,' 23
the courts will authorize sale of homesteads larger than one-half acre
in cases where, for zoning or other reasons, the property cannot be
physically divided. In those cases, the court will decide how much of
the sale proceeds are protected by the exemption and remit that
amount to the debtor in cash. 124 When this occurs, debtors find them-
selves in the same situation that would exist under this Article's pro-
posal: holding cash to be invested in post-bankruptcy life and/or
business rather than continuing to reside in their pre-bankruptcy
homestead. Any difference that these proposals make for debtors in
this situation will simply be in terms of the amount protected and an
elimination of temptations to convert assets during the approach to
bankruptcy. Moreover, debtors will continue to be able to preserve
their homes by agreeing to repayment plans under Chapter 13 rather
than merely discharging their debts under Chapter 7.
It may be argued that debtors who have more property than the
amounts proposed by this Article should not have the right to keep it
from their creditors without agreeing to at least partial repayment from
future income under the terms of Chapter 13. 125 In response, creditors
are likely to object that the proposal will actually reduce their recovery
from the average bankruptcy estate. This is because, despite the overall
reductions in exemptions that might theoretically be claimed—at least
in states allowing high or unlimited exemptions—more debtors will
actually be able to exempt more property under this proposal. The
answer, as noted below with regard to the question of bankruptcy
planning, 126 is that basic bankruptcy policy requires that debtors be
122 See, e.g., In re Evans, 51 B.R. 47, 50 (Banks. D. Vt. 1985).
1 " See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
144 See In re Englander, 95 F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (11th Cir. 1996).
125 Some caution, however, is needed on this matter. Despite widespread pressure faun
creditor groups to push more debtors into repayment plans under Chapter 13, empirical evidence
suggests that the chapter does not actually result in better outcomes for debtors or creditors than
under Chapter 7, since most debtors fail to complete the payments promised by their Chapter
13 plans. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 222.
146 See infra paragraph accompanying note 128.
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allowed to make their "fresh start" with property whose value should
not depend upon the location and type of the property.
b. The Proposal Will Not Materially Reduce Litigation
It also may be argued that debtor-creditor litigation will persist
under the proposal, primarily over the valuation of property claimed
under the umbrella exemption. Although litigation over exemption
issues will not disappear entirely, there are good reasons to believe that
this litigation will be sharply reduced.
To begin with, the moral hazard now posed under the rubric of
bankruptcy planning will disappear.'" Not only will debtors no longer
be tempted to move from state to state in order to maximize their
exempt property, but the asset conversion problem will disappear when
debtors can simply decide what property they want to include under a
uniform exemption umbrella.
This is a far better solution than that offered by the legislation
currently before Congress, which would simply restrict the time a
debtor would have to acquire exempt property in order to qualify for
exemption in bankruptcy. 128 That type of rule favors the more sophis-
ticated debtor, who can "time" bankruptcy to greatest advantage, over
the poorer, less sophisticated debtor, who is caught suddenly by eco-
nomic catastrophe. Bankruptcy policy, aside from favoring equality
among debtors, dictates that exemption amounts should be based on
what the debtor needs for a fresh start, rather than on the fortuitous
nature of what categories of property he or she happened to own on
a given date.
Of course, there will always be some opportunities to litigate over
the value of property that a debtor wants to claim as exempt; this
situation exists under present law and would exist under the NBRC's
proposals to an even greater extent than under this proposal. A rea-
sonable upper limit on the umbrella amount, such as the $50,000
suggested by this Article, will materially reduce overall creditor incen-
tives to litigate debtor valuations of exempt property, except in the
unusual case where the debtor's claims are obviously outrageous—situ-
ations that should be limited by the professional responsibility of debt-
or's counsel.'
127 See supra Part 11.B.1.
1"See H.R. 124, 106th Cong. (1999).
129 See MODEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.3. (1983).
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c. The Proposal Is a Federal Encroachment on States' Rights
The most powerful opposition to the idea of eliminating all refer-
ence to state exemption law is likely to be based on the notion that
this constitutes a federal encroachment on states' rights. This was the
rock upon which the 1970 Commission's recommendations for a uni-
form schedule of federal exemptions was wrecked, leaving the mess
now found at Code § 522. 1"
The Constitution, by providing for a uniform bankruptcy system,
intended to make bankruptcy a matter of federal law. James Madison,
writing in the Federalist Papers, noted that uniform federal bankruptcy
provisions were closely bound up with the advancement of interstate
commerce and "will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expedi-
ency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.""'
Until the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, all federal bankruptcy statutes
established uniform federal exemption provisions.'" The first of these
statutes, the 1800 Bankruptcy Act, was passed by a Congress that in-
cluded signers of the Constitution and was signed into law by President
John Adams, who was himself one of the Founders. The assumption
of the hodgepodge of state-by-state exemption law into the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 was not traditional bankruptcy exemption law, but a major
Congressional error that was strongly criticized at that time and con-
tinues to be criticized today. Actual experience with state exemptions
shows that its lack of uniformity has had many undesirable effects, both
in terms of the inequities and the moral hazard posed by debtors
relocating to seize greater exemptions. No compensating advantages
have been shown.
Restoring a truly federal exemption system will have benefits
reaching beyond the bankruptcy system itself. One benefit is that the
learning process goes both ways. In other words, states may learn from
federal legislation at least as much as state law "experiments" may help
to inform federal lawmakers. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is
a good example of that process: the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, when drafting its replacement for the old Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act, borrowed heavily from Bankruptcy
Code § 548. 1 " The states also have much to gain from modernizing
15° See Lawrence PonorofT, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 Am. BANKR. U.
221,223-24 (1997).
ISI THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (New American Library ed., 1961).
155 See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
I" See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994); see also, Michael L. Cook & Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform
Raudulent 7)'ansfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AK BANKR, U. 87 (1988).
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their exemption laws, which, as noted above,"' need an overhaul more
so than most bodies of law. 135
 Aside from modernization, greater uni-
formity in state exemption law is as desirable here as it is in other fields
where states have adopted uniform laws. It is no more in states' interest
to have debtors moving from state to state to take advantage of exemp-
tions outside of bankruptcy—for protection against particular judg-
ments—than it is in the interest of bankruptcy policy
d. The Proposal Is Too Radical to Be Adopted
Sometimes it is easier to discard a complex system that does not
work well than to fix it by adding new components here and hammer-
ing on old ones there. Good examples of this include the Copernican
view of the solar system, the U.S. Constitution and the Bankruptcy
Code itself.
Exemption reform has made frustratingly slow progress over the
last few decades. The most progress came with adoption of the Bank-
ruptcy Code itself in 1978, although this represented two steps forward
and one step back.' 5
 The source of resistance to change has been the
difficulty of imposing a federal list of exemptions in place of the lists
provided by the various states. Accordingly, progress might be achieved
once bankruptcy exemption law is totally decoupled from state exemp-
tions. Instead of arguing over how much and what kind of property a
debtor should be able to protect (with special interests arguing over
nickels and dimes for each type of property), the debate would switch
to how much in overall value a debtor may fairly protect from creditors
in the bankruptcy process.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that, barely two decades after the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, the U.S. bankruptcy system has once again been thrown
open for potentially radical revision. Whether or not this is desirable,
it furnishes an opportunity to consider business left unfinished in 1978,
' 34 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
1 " Several states have modernized their exemption laws in recent years, in part responding
to the 1970 Commission's report and the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See, e.g..
William]. Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335,
344-45 (1982). It appears reasonable to believe that these reforms would have been more
thorough had federal reform been more complete, and that there will be corresponding state
responses to new federal reform.
156
 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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particularly where experience under the 1978 Reform Act has shown
the importance of completing the task of revision.
The exemption system established by § 522 of the present Bank-
ruptcy Code is a prominent example of this kind of unfinished busi-
ness. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act, taking a misguided step from prior
bankruptcy law, authorized debtors to use the exemptions of their state
of domicile, rather than extending the older scheme of a uniform list
of federal exemptions. Despite strong criticism from the inception of
the state-exemption scheme to the reconsideration of bankruptcy law
by the 1970 Commission, Congress refused to return to a uniform
federal exemption system and instead, with Code § 522, created a
hybrid system that adds unnecessary complexity to deplorable inequity.
Under the system as it presently exists, debtors may be faced with
a difficult choice between complex lists of exemptions or being locked
into state exemption schedules that vary strikingly from state to state.
The variation is such that a debtor in one state may come away from
bankruptcy with only a few thousand dollars in pre-bankruptcy prop-
erty (or conceivably, less still), while a debtor just across the state line
may come away with property worth millions. These variations do not
correspond to differences in cost of living. They are unfair not only to
debtors but to their creditors as well and have the further undesirable
effect of burdening the courts with litigation over transfers of property
in anticipation of bankruptcy.
The way to deal with these problems once and for all is to decou-
ple federal bankruptcy exemption law from the exemptions provided
by state debtor-creditor law. This decoupling should be total—not just
to set up a list of federal exemptions that derive from state analogues,
but to establish a different concept for exemptions in bankruptcy,
which would establish an overall exempt amount and let the debtor
choose property of any kind valued up to that limit. A well-advised
debtor could choose property up to the value limit best suited for a
fresh start, rather than, as under present law, being limited by property
owned before bankruptcy.
